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Practices Providing Order: The Private Military/Security Business and 
Global Security Governance 
 
Anna Leander 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper explains, or perhaps better rationalizes, why I have ended up thinking that so 
called “practice” theory provides the most adequate entry point for theorizing about 
business in/and global governance.1 But more than this the key ambition is to spell out 
what it means to work with practice theory and what kind of leverage it gives for 
understanding the role of business in global governance. The paper therefore begins by an 
account of two major difficulties thinking in terms of practices are useful for 
circumventing. The general thrust of that section is to underline why it may be useful to 
think in terms of practices in the first place rather than sticking with some of its 
admittedly more parsimonious and less labor intense alternatives. The rest of the paper 
then tries to outline what it means (in my view) to work with practices. The second 
section focuses on how we know whose/what practices matter. It emphasizes the 
importance of allowing for contextual differentiation when mapping activities and their 
hierarchies. It also underscores the significance of remaining open about who and what is 
important. It points to the centrality of different forms of capital (economic, social, 
cultural and symbolic) in defining whose activities matter. But even more strongly it links 
up with actor-network-theory’s insight that also objects and technologies “act” in social 
relations. The third section suggests that to fully grasp the why practices work as they do 
and why specific activities and actors within practices come dominate it is necessary to 
look at dispositions and taken for granted views. It underlines that although the habitus is 
an attractive way of capturing this, it remains necessary to account for the broader doxa 
or discourses and for the technologies through which they are effective. Finally, the last 
section pulls together some thoughts on how thinking in terms of practices helps 
understand “governance” and changes in governance. The paper suggest that thinking in 
terms of practices underlines governance as order (rather than formal rule), that it 
facilitates thinking about change/resistance and finally that it underlines the importance 
of reflexivity in academia and beyond. To give some “real-world-empirical” sense to this 
account, and to counteract the impression that this is solipsistic theory for theory’s own 
sake, I anchor my arguments in my work on the private military/security business. 
 
                                                 
1 For an overview and introduction see (Schatzki et al., 2000). Who exactly is included varies rather 
substantially. I refer mainly to the thinking of Bourdieu, Foucault, Schatzki and the actor network (ANT) 
theorist Latour for the reason that I draw most on their work.  
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1) Why Look at Practices? 
 
A decade ago, the private military/security business2 was much smaller than today and its 
development largely unknown. This was before the extensive media coverage of the 
“privatized wars” in Afghanistan and Iraq, before four Blackwater contractors were 
lynched, burned and hung up on a bridge in Fallujah, before Blackwater contractors shot 
17 people in the Nisour square in Baghdad and well before the flood of books hearings, 
investigations and discussions on private contractor accountability that have pushed the 
US democrats to place the issue centrally on their political. A decade ago, the private 
military/security business was discussed mainly among security specialists whether in the 
armed forces, in the think tank environment or in academia. The occasional “scandal” 
made it into the media as for example when Sandline shipped arms to Sierra Leone, 
MPRI “trained” Croat forces in the midst of the war or when Executive Outcomes was 
hired to impose order in Papua New Guinea. But overall, the business of military services 
was small and generally considered of marginal significance for international politics and 
global governance. Today the situation is very different. There is a hype surrounding the 
private market for force. Scores of publications, meetings, documentaries, articles and 
investigations come. Yet, in a rather interesting way this is another case illustrating that 
the more things change the more they remain the same as Giuseppe di Lampedusa puts it 
in the Gattopardo. The private military/security business continues to be kept at the 
margins of discussions about global security governance. The bulk of scholars in 
International Relations, International Political Economy and Globalization proceed with 
business as usual in thinking about security governance. This is tied to the glasses (or 
perhaps better the blinders) they wear which prevent private military/security business 
from appearing; the private security business is made invisible. I want to insist on two 
blinders that I have found particularly frustrating and unhelpful when I have tried to 
communicate about the private military/security business: formalism and methodological 
individualism. A good reason to turn to practices is that it helps remove those blinders.  
  
a) Breaking the Procrustean bed of formalism 
The most effective and also one of most common ways of preventing private military 
business to make its entrance into discussions about global security governance is what I 
call formalism here for want of a better term. What I have in mind is the tendency to look 
at the formal procedural set up of governance relations. Scholars look at the extent to 
which institutionalized negotiation and bargaining surrounding decisions relevant to the 
governance of military relations have changed. They look at the way the legal authority 
has shifted from private to public actors in the security realm. They ask to what extent 
“sovereignty” or more specifically the control of the state over the use of force has been 
                                                 
2 When I talk about military/security business in this paper I refer to firms providing military/security 
services (including direct provision of security, logistical support, training and intelligence) in the context 
of armed conflict. The reason I do not refer simply to military services is that the lines between war/pear 
and inside/outside is sliding in the contemporary context with the consequence that much of what is called 
as security services (particularly since the firms providing them seem to have decided that they cannot talk 
about military services as these are of more dubious legitimacy) could also be called military services and 
vice versa. For introductory discussions of this business see (Avant, 2005, Leander, 2006a, Singer, 2003) . 
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undermined.3 I do not suggest that this kind of work is unimportant or uninteresting. 
There are excellent theoretical and practical reasons for taking an interest in the formal 
procedures surrounding security privatization. Upholding effective procedures or 
reforming/creating new ones if necessary, is the only way of holding the private military 
business accountable (legally, politically and economically). Hence, the heated disputes 
about what kinds of formal procedures are most effective and appropriate for the business 
as well as about the extent to which existing laws are sufficient (and just need to be more 
effectively used) or whether on the contrary we need to reform law and perhaps even 
rethink it radically. There can be no doubt that as relatives of contractors or their victims, 
citizens, and tax-payers we have excellent reasons to care about these disputes and their 
outcomes. 
However, the focus on formalism and procedures also has some serious 
drawbacks and it seems to me that awareness of these could substantially benefit the 
discussion about formal procedures and their effectiveness. The focus on form and 
procedure tends become a Procrustean bed for thinking about the private military/security 
business in global governance. Procrustes (the stretcher) had an iron bed into which he 
invited every passerby to lie down. If the guest proved too tall, he would amputate the 
excess length; if the victim was found too short, he was then stretched out on the rack 
until he fit, the bed having been adjusted by Procrustes beforehand. Similarly, when the 
the private military/security business is dealt with from a formalistic perspective limbs 
that do not fit the perspective tend to be cut off. For example, states have formal 
monopoly authority to decide on the “legitimate use of force” and are likely to continue 
to enjoy this privilege. At the same time privatization has created practices where the 
private military/security business is charged with interpreting these rules in practice, with 
writing them, and with deciding who can use force. On September 16 2007 the 
Blackwater contractors in Nisour Square were interpreting rules of engagement, they had 
partly written these rules (as they are defined in the contract it had with the State 
Department). More broadly Blackwater’s (and other private military/security firms’) have 
a significant say both over what is legitimate use of force in Iraq (the general 
understanding of legitimate uses of force as US strategic doctrine is partly written by 
private companies) and over who can use force legitimately (through firm selection of 
clients). These practices do not end the formal state “monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force”. But once that is said, a formalist focus prevents us from thinking about this in 
detail. In Procrustean fashion it cuts them out of the picture and correspondingly 
impoverishes our understanding of security governance.4
 In addition to this, formalism often lures observers to engage in Procrustean 
stretching of their categories. The stretching of the notions of public and of private has 
been of particular concern as regards my work on the private military business. 
Depending on their intent and their focus, observers and participants often try to stretch 
either of the two categories to fit them into an argument about form. By simply positing 
                                                 
3 E.g. (Doswald-Beck, 2007, Frye, 2005, Hallo de Wolf, 2007, Keohane, 2003, and, 2005a, Krahmann, 
2005b, Scoville, 2006, Shearer, 1998, Walker and Whyte, 2005). 
4 This point is eloquently made in different terms and in more detail by Cutler (2006: 202) who argues that 
“The analytical and theoretical foundations of international law form obstacles to the development of 
international economic law regulating corporate conduct vecause the render multination corporations 
legally ‘invisble’”. 
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that the private military/security business is really a “private” actor or that the state is 
really “public” they can resolve (or better exclude, ignore and escape from) many of the 
disturbing practices signaling that this is not the case. The lines between the public and 
the private are not only “blurred” as it is often pointed out. Blurred would presuppose that 
there were in fact two distinct realms with unclear boundaries. The situation is more 
complex as public, state actors are integrated in to the private realm and behaving 
accordingly and the reverse is true of the private actors. “Civilian technicians assisting in 
the collection of surveillance data during operations missions [...] civilian maintainers 
providing battlefield maintenance of a TOW missile, the M1A1, the Bradley, or the 
Patriot missile [..] and contractors supporting the gathering and interpreting of data from 
the Joint Air Forces Corntrol Centre and feeding intelligence and targeting information to 
operators” are not simply private actors (Zamparelli, 1999: 14). Similarly, the police and 
the armed forces in the Northern Ivory Coast (or vice president Cheney in the US) are not 
simply public actors. According to an observer with long standing experience in the area: 
“when I think of the state taking over the provision of security, I think of it as being 
privatized” (also Bigo, 2000, and, 2001, Förster, 2007). Positing that business is private 
and state is public may have the virtue of saving a formalistic legal framework. But the 
connotations of those terms severely distorts our understanding security governance and 
is hopelessly inadequate when it comes to solving the practical problems faced by those 
engaging the formal procedures governing real world (in)security. 
Shifting attention from the focus on formal processes and authorities to practices is a 
way of breaking the Procrustean bed of formalism and venturing to look at the stuff that 
matters for security governance: who ensures what kind of security for whom in what 
kind of way by what means. As just suggested this may be necessary pre-condition for 
tackling the indeed very important questions about formal procedures and rules. But 
before detailing why I say this and what I mean by practices I need to point to a second 
major blinder the focus on practices is helpful in lifting: the blinders imposed by 
methodological individualism. 
 
b) Escaping the irrational focus on rational action / re-assembling the social 
A second blinder that keeps insights about the private military/security business from 
penetrating discussions about global security governance is the tendency to focus 
attention on only one actor and one relationship at the time. In one of his earliest 
reactions to the 16 September 2007 Nisour incident, Sectary of Defense Robert Gates 
came out and underlined that Blackwater and its behavior should be seen as the “bad egg 
that might spoil the basket”. Similarly, the overwhelming part of critical writing about the 
industry has focused on identifying the (indeed abundant number of) situations where one 
firm, in one specific relationship has somehow violated existing norms (e.g.Rasor and 
Bauman, 2007, Scahill, 2007, Singer, 2003, but also Verkuil, 2007). I do not want to 
suggest that it is mistaken to point to specific cases where private military/security firms 
behave in blatant disregard of political, economic, legal and social norms. However, the 
risk with the bad egg in the basket logic -- whether used to argue that the bad egg must be 
removed from the basket or to show that the basket is already spoiled beyond salvation -- 
is that it detracts attention from absolutely essential questions about security governance 
and the political economy underlying it. It puts the blinds on the questions of how the 
creation of a collective institution, the market, in the area of security reshapes the overall 
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landscape of security governance even if it is well governed and the bad eggs removed. 
The focus on the individual rationality of actions irrationally chops the social world to 
pieces without providing the tools and time necessary to assemble it again or to note that 
rationality may be changing. 
The bad eggs in the basket figure of thought has had (the no doubt unintended) effect 
of crowding out critical assessments of the private military/security business and its 
relation to global governance. This is not only a matter of time and space being exhausted 
by the effort place in thinking about single firms, cases and occurrences. At a deeper 
level, it is tied to the prevailing dominance of methodological individualism in social 
science thinking in which it is embedded. Two decades of rational choice approaches 
seem to have restricted analytical focus to individual rational actions while at same time 
eroding the analytical capacity to uncover the foundations of rationality. 
For critical analysis of the private military/security business this is damning. From the 
start it excludes questions that involve situations where what is important is not the 
actions and strategies of a firm or a government in given situation, but the effects of the 
creation a new collective institution these individual actions are part and parcel of but 
which cannot adequately be captured by the individualist focus or by an understanding of 
the individual case. We can for example look at the Nisour incident, show that 
Blackwater contractors broke some rules, respected others. But if we stick to the 
incidence we have little leverage to say anything about transformations of global security 
governance. If we wanted such a leverage, we would have to place that the incidence in 
the more general context of security privatization and outsourcing and even more broadly 
in the context of shifting understandings of the forms and aims of security governance 
that have accompanied the shift to neo-liberal forms of security governance. We would 
have to replace Nisour in the context of more general market practices. However, the 
individualist framing of problems militates against such efforts to reassemble the social 
world to make sense of strategic choices and the rationality from which they make sense. 
More than discouraging the analysis of dynamics and contexts beyond the single case 
generally, individualist “bad eggs in the basket” strategy for analyzing private security 
has marginalized work on the normal and unspectacular effects of creating private 
security markets in particular. Critical work is on what well intentioned firms, staffed 
with people who follow all the legal, political and social norms of their context entail for 
security governance is scarce (Leander, 2007c). Critical scholars often dismiss the 
thought that such a situation could exist and be worthwhile investigating or even thinking 
about. As a consequence, the analysis is handed over to industry supporters and lobbyists 
who are allowed to interpret this undisturbed by would be critical objections. This 
entrenches the view that if we could only manage contracts properly, get the bad eggs out 
of the basket, and create the proper regulatory structures; there would be no reason to fret 
about the development of the private military/security business. The logical conclusion is 
that the proper thing to do is to focus on cases where things somehow went wrong and 
see how that might have been avoided. That in the process of focusing on these individual 
cases and the mending the things that went wrong we may be losing sight of the broader 
picture is conveniently forgotten.  
Finally, for reasons purely idiosyncratic to the discussions about private security the 
bad eggs in the basket way of thinking about the industry has been unhelpful to critical 
debate and dialogue. By focusing so much attention on cases and examples of the 
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rationality of private military/security business that “misbehaves”, critical observers have 
paradoxically undermined the legitimacy of critical argument. It makes it so easy for 
market advocates to box all critical voices in one category: those who deny the private 
military/security business any virtue. This kind of sweeping denial jars with the firms’ 
self-image but also with the image they have with concerned communities. It is hard to 
argue that EO’s ending of the Sierra Leone civil war, the protection of refugee camps in 
Goma, or the personal security services offered to the many NGOs and diplomats 
working in conflict zones around the world have nothing positive. The firms as well as 
their clients tell a very different story. They talk back and loudly reject simplistic 
assumptions and generalizations about military firm rationality and behavior. It is even 
harder to sustain with a straight face that private military services hired to “stop the next 
Rwanda” as the sector propaganda mouth piece Doug Brooks would phrase it would 
necessarily be negative (e.g., 2005). When critics are boxed as taking these untenable 
positions their credibility is severely undermined and communication impaired. 
That one might miss the forest for staring at the trees is not exactly a new insight, but 
it is often forgotten in the analysis of the private military/security business. It is irrational 
to direct attention exclusively to the rational actions and strategies in given situations and 
think that one can capture those by only looking at the single case. To think about 
security governance we clearly need a way of re-assembling the social to think about 
collective institutions. Similarly to moving away from a focus on formal rules and 
definitions seems to be of essence if one is not to miss the bulk of what makes the private 
military/security business relevant to private security government. I have made these two 
points with reference to work on the private military/security business and its role in 
global governance. However, they most probably also haunt discussions of private 
business in other areas global governance as well. The precise ways in which formalism 
and methodological individualism make firms invisible and critique difficult will no 
doubt vary greatly. Therefore the remainder of this paper which is construed to discuss 
how and why thinking in terms of practices may be useful to bring firms back in to a 
broader picture of global governance may be useful also for people working on other 
businesses than the (in)security one.  
 
 
2) Understanding whose/what practices matter: Thinking of positions in a “field” 
 
When people say that they think in terms of practices the usually mean that they think 
about what people say and do. The reason they talk about practices rather than simply 
about action, agency and speaking is the need to signal that their approach differs quite 
substantially from the standard individualist based approaches. The speaking and doing in 
practices includes a bundle of activities, joined by a common recognition of what the 
practice is about. Hence the notion of practice centrally incorporates taken for granted 
“inter-subjectively constituted” understandings.5 Grasping how these understandings 
(discourses) develop, evolve and what they do is a key part of working with practices; so 
is studying the how practices (re)produce these understandings. In that sense one might 
say that work on practices is an attempt to break out of the individualist/holist dilemma. 
                                                 
5 “A  practice is a ‘bundle’ of activities […] practices are open, temporally unfolding nexus of action and a 
practice is a set of doings and sayings” (Schatzki, 2002: 71-73). 
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Moreover, as work on practices is usually empirically based and in includes bodily 
expression, it has also been understood as a way of breaking the mind/body and the 
idealist/realist dichotomies (e.g. Brubaker, 2004). This is no place to go into a detailed 
discussion of how and if this works or to detail the disputes and disagreements within the 
approach.6 What matters for now is just to underline that by contrast to the standard 
accounts of agency and action, a reference to practices signals a work which is not 
located at the individualist level and where working with and problematizing socially 
constituted meanings is of essence. The remaining sections of this paper one venture into 
substantiating what this difference mean for practical work in IPE. Specifically, I will 
continue to draw examples from the discussions about the role of business in global 
governance referring to the private military business to illustrate what kind of study 
thinking of terms of practices produces and how it helps making private business 
possible. In this section tackle the absolutely fundamental question of how to know which 
practices matter.  
 
a) Acknowledging differentiation in the global political economy 
Focusing on formal institutions and procedures is likely to make it very difficult to 
capture the role of business in global governance as argued in detail above. Moving on to 
consider the “practices” that make up the global governance is a step away from that 
difficulty. However, once that step is taken it is still necessary to settle exactly what 
practices one should be looking at. Common sense, but also conventional international 
political economy would warn us against assuming that the role of business in global 
governance would be the same everywhere. Keohane and Nye’s (2000) distinctions 
between areas governed by power and those governed by complex interdependence is a 
classical statement of this point. Indeed that insight is now so much part of common 
sense in IPE that most works are divided into issue areas. Textbooks cover usually some 
combination of trade, finance, and production (Cohn, 2008, Frieden and Lake, 1995, 
Gilpin, 1987, Miller, 2007, Ravenhill, 2005, Stubbs and Underhill, 1994).  
 In general terms work on practices echoes this emphasis on the need to 
differentiate. Bourdieu and his followers (who have played a central role in the 
development of thinking about practices) for example link practices to what they call 
“fields”. Fields are defined by the fact that those who participate in the field share an 
understanding of the stakes at stake in the field. Fields can vary in generality and scope 
and any individual is of course part of many fields at the same time (a family, a work 
place, a social context, a political system, an international society etc). The fields develop 
and reproduce their own slightly idiosyncratic rules (through the practices in the field). 
These may sometimes be written down, but more often they are not. In fact, most of those 
in the field would find it hard to spell them out. They are rules of the kind one knows and 
but would find hard to explain. To the extent that they are reflected on, they are intensely 
struggled over. Finally, the fields are linked to each other and developments in one field 
tend to be reflected also in other fields.7 This Bourdieuan notion of a field has very clear 
                                                 
6 For discussions see key works such as (Bourdieu, 1980, Latour, 2005, Schatzki, et al., 2000). For 
introductions (Swidler, 1986). See also for discussion and applications in IPE (de Goede, 2006, Huysmans, 
2006 forthcoming, Larner and Walters, 2004, Leander, 2007d, Pouliot, 2007). 
7 Bourdieu’s own work relates extensively to fields. The clearest discussion is in (Bourdieu, 1979). But the 
discussion most relevant to IPE is his discussion of the economic field (Bourdieu, 1997) There is a 
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equivalents in other parts of thinking about practices, including e.g. Luhmanian 
differentiated systems, Wittgensteinian differentiations of different language games and 
but also as for example in Foucault's dispositifs, Deleuze and Guattari's agencements and 
Latour and Callon's reseaux. What these notions share is that they “designate a common 
figure: social things organized in configurations, where they hang together, determine 
one another via their connections, as combined both exert effects on other configurations 
of things and are transformed through the action of other configurations, and therewith 
constitute the setting and medium of human action, interaction, and coexistence” 
(Schatzki, 2002: xiii). 
 A key question when it comes to differentiating realms of practices is how to 
draw the lines around the differentiation. How do we know what the relevant bundle of 
sayings and doings is when we want to understand for example global security 
governance? Coming from the practices, the answer is that we have to look at who 
understands themselves and is understood by others to be part of the field of global 
security governance. This answer is one that explicitly includes the possibility that the 
boundaries of a field may fluctuate and change as in time. Bourdieu for example saw 
shifting the boundaries of fields as key to shifting power relations more on this below. 
But also Schatzki stresses the openness and fluidity of bundles of practices. More than 
this, the answer has in common with some of the “regime” literature in IPE that it avoids 
the trap of excluding private actors simply by predefining the relevant actors as states, a 
point made by Susan Strange who found it a good reason to sympathize with the 
literature (1998a). It saps the a priori assumption that the public private division is the 
most relevant division in any context. But more than this, it also helpfully distracts 
attention from the inside/outside division that haunts all thinking about IR/IPE. It 
becomes an empirical question to what extent the inside outside boundary is central for 
the practices studied. Thinking about the role of private military business in global 
security governance both of these moves are extremely important. Moving away from a 
priori assumptions about the relative relevance public and private actors for governance 
makes it possible to pay serious attention to the sector in the first place. Breaking with the 
insider outside makes it possible to focus on the transnational “global” nature of the 
practices in the sector denying the relevance of national traditions or differences.  
 Thinking in terms of practices differentiated according to fields (or something 
equivalent) has the potential because of breaking with the “methodological nationalism” 
that haunts so much of the work in the social sciences. I do not claim that practice theory 
is the only way of doing this (as indicated above) nor would I contend that all practice 
theory uses this potential. On the contrary, part of the work in this tradition is proudly and 
firmly nationalist in its framings (e.g. Dezalay, 2007). The point here is that the potential 
is there to be developed.  
 
b) Mapping positions in fields 
Fields do not only need to be identified delimited they have to be filled with the actors 
who are doing and saying the things that make up the practices in the field. And 
especially to make get any sense of what practices matter it is necessary to map out the 
“positions” of actors relative to one another, that is to begin tackling the question of what 
                                                                                                                                                 
mountainous secondary literature on fields. For an introduction see (Martin, 2003). For an discussion of the 
relevance in security (Bigo, 2003, and 2005).  
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kind of power relations exist in the field. This question is of obvious pertinence to those 
interested in thinking about the role of private business in global governance. If we say 
that private business matters for global governance we are implicitly saying that they 
have some form of power and that their practices matter. 
The question is how to tackle this mapping exercise. There are a variety of answers to 
this question depending on what kind of practice theory one works with. However, the 
answers have at least two things in common. The first of these is that they emphasize the 
relational aspect of the mapping. This may seem a rather banal point to underline as any 
mapping exercise is by definition relational. But it is worth underling because relational 
has a dual meaning. Actors are placed in relation to each other and hierarchies hence 
mapped out (meaning 1). However, unlike the assumptions often made in IR/IPE we 
cannot simply assume that certain resources (for example armed forces, economic wealth, 
or technical capabilities) will confer “power” and advantages to the actors in the field. 
Rather, relations in the field (meaning 2) are fundamentally important for establishing 
where to map the actors. The logic of the field, the rules of the game, decides what kind 
of resources will confer advantages in a given field and how they will do that. Struggles 
to reshape or preserve these definitions are therefore rather unsurprisingly a permanent 
feature practices in any field. 
This leads to the second common point about mapping: if it is to work well, the 
mapping exercise has to remain open about what the nature of the “resources” are. This is 
the essence of Bourdieu and his follower’s introduction of multiple ideas of capital. 
Hence they emphasize that not only may economic capital matter, but so may other forms 
of “capital”. Capital is intersubjectively constituted through the practices in the field. 
Hence “capital” may stem from the mobilization of a positive bias (symbolic capital) or 
from being anchored in a social network (social capital) or from having political 
connections (political capital) or from mastering a cultural code (cultural capital) or from 
being part of cosmopolitan networks (cosmopolitan capital) etc. etc. There is no a priori 
and natural hierarchy between them, nor is there any guarantee that they remain stable in 
time. The mapping exercise is consequently a demanding one as it can only be properly 
carried out if the field is well enough understood to actually know what kind of hierarchy 
reigns.8 In the actor network theory the necessity to remain open about the nature of 
resources is even greater. Here the emphasis on fluidity, diversity and visibility is much 
greater. Power and hierarchies here are produced in the constantly changing interactions 
which make up the social world. They therefore have to be extrapolated from these 
relationships (Latour, 2006: 118-9). This makes it rather inadequate to talk about 
“resources”; the world connotes at least minimal permanence. Power is in the relationship 
itself. Moreover, obviously the relevant (non-)resources are specific to a given network 
(the ANT field equivalent), but since the network itself is in constant flux so will the 
power relations be. The mapping exercise is becoming even more demanding. One of the 
arguments Bruno Latour gives for not trying to replace the actor network theory, the 
acronym of which is ANT, is that the reference to ants suitably conveys the kind of work 
shouldered by those working with the approach. Similarly, Bourdieu repeatedly 
expressed his disdain for those who refused to engage in hard and time consuming 
                                                 
8 For IPE relevant applications of capital in this sense see e.g. (Betensky, 2000, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1999, Huysmans, 2002, Kauppi, 1996, Poupeau, 2004, Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004). 
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empirical work. As this paper proceeds the full extent to which these statements are both 
honest reflections will certainly become clearer.  
 Hard work however is worthwhile when the result is satisfying. From that 
perspective, engaging in a relational mapping of positions thinking about the business in 
global security governance may not be such a bad idea. It makes it possible to retain the 
insights of the “linguistic” or “epistemological” turn in our discipline. It leaves open the 
prospect that whose practices matter for the governance of a the hard and material 
military sphere may be profoundly shaped by “ideas” about security, about government 
or about markets and the capacity of different actors to draw on these. At the same time it 
does lead into a form of absurd idealism which denies that for a military firm it may 
matter quite substantially whether it has a financial base sufficient to launch a major 
advertisement campaign or to fund a politician/political party. Mapping positions helps 
incorporate and clarify the significance and of both “material” and “ideational” resources 
in thinking about whose practices matter.  
  
c) Keeping sight of objects and technology 
Before closing this discussion about how to capture whose practices matter, I want to 
touch upon a subject that is pivotal to one kind of practice theory, the ANT, namely the 
issue of how to integrate and think about the role of objects and of technology. The 
reason of course is not only or even mainly that it is important for ANT, but rather that it 
is an issue which is central in a number of fields where business has a role in global 
governance. Susan Strange for example insisted heavily in her revision of Casino 
Capitalism, that is in Mad Money, that she thought technology was a totally overlooked 
and still remained to be integrated into thinking about IPE (Strange, 1998b, and 1998c). 
Similarly, it is impossible to conceive of the private business role in the military/security 
business without reference to the so called revolution in military affairs. The expansion of 
contracting is parts of the business is hardly conceivable independently of the reliance on 
unmanned armed vehicles of different kinds and the increased reliance on “off-the-shelf”, 
“dual use” technologies. But even on the low tech end of the business there can be no 
doubt that the development of ever more advanced surveillance, alarm, and remote 
protection technologies has played a fundamental role in shaping markets. In Kenya for 
example the distinction between upmarket and lower market security firms is intimately 
tied to what they can offer and the international (mainly East African) expansion of KK is 
in no small part tied to its superior equipment and technology (Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2006). There can in other words be little doubt that technology is of central 
importance and needs to be an integral part of accounts. Not terribly controversial. The 
question is how. 
  A central part of ANT is the suggestion that we need to think about objects and 
technologies as “actors” in networks. The reason is not of course that they somehow 
think and act independently. Rather the reason is that there is symmetry between people 
and objects in the sense that both people and objects make things happen. “Things can 
authorize, make possible, encourage, make available, allow, suggest, influence, hinder, 
prohibit and so on” (Latour, 2006: 104, my translation). From this perspective, endowing 
objects and technologies with agency merely amounts to rejecting the “false asymmetry 
between intentional human action and causal material world” (Latour, 2006: 109, my 
translation). Needless to say this breakdown of the distinction between the material, 
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object world and the human, social world does not exactly meet with universal approval. 
Practice theorists not working within the ANT perspective reject it with insistence. 
Moreover, it goes so much against the grain of how we speak and think that it is really an 
open question if it is worth insisting on the fact that objects and technology have agency 
at least with that wording. Latour has to spend the good part of his 400 pages long book 
introduction to ANT developing and explaining the idea. Perhaps the energy could have 
been better used? 
 This said, the substantive idea that objects and technologies do in fact have a 
status somewhat apart is an important one that deserves to be taken seriously. They 
cannot merely be thought of as “resources” used by actors. One can try (as Schatzki does) 
to integrate them as part of the “context” (more on this shortly) in which practices are 
embedded. This solution makes it possible to keep focus on the extent to which 
technology and objects make things happen and are essential to understanding whose and 
what practices matter. It is a rather elegant way of steering clear of the controversies 
(which I have no way of resolving in this paper and generally not much ambition to 
tackle) that come from claiming that “objects” and “technology” has agency while at the 
same time retaining the very important point that technology makes possible, authorizes, 
prohibits etc and therefore deserves a squarely central place in the analysis. For the 
purpose of the argument here that is certainly sufficient as it serves the purpose of 
recalling the extent to which technology and objects need to be an integral and central 
part of the analysis.  
 To sum up, to analyze practices it is necessary to acknowledge that the social 
world, including that of global governance, is highly differentiated and to delimit and 
specify the field or bundles or networks of practices that are central to the research 
question asked (for example what the global governance of security looks like and does). 
It was emphasized that there is absolutely no logical necessity for the conventional 
dividing lines in political (outside/inside, private/public) to be the most pertinent for the 
delimitation of a field. This has rather momentous advantages for the study of business in 
global (security) governance: it is not rendered invisible from the start. The actors then 
have to be “mapped” into the field. This is necessary to beginning getting a grasp of 
whose practice (activity) are actually central to the research question; to be concrete to 
get a sense for what practices (sayings and doings) of what security firms, public security 
establishment, government administrations, departments and think tanks are central. 
Finally, the section emphasized the importance of keeping in mind that technology and 
objects -- the innovations in weapons systems, surveillance technology in short the 
revolution in military affairs -- have to be integrated centrally in the analysis as they are 
not only tools in the hands of other actors but profoundly shape interaction. It was 
suggested that simply for reasons of the energy taken up by the controversies over 
whether or not this role actually is sufficient to impute “agency” makes it more adequate 
to think in terms of contexts and this leads straight onto the analysis in the next section. 
 
 
3) Understanding why Practices Matter: Thinking of Dispositions beyond the “Field” 
 
To ask what practice matter and mapping them in leaves the question of why they matter 
by and large unanswered. Yet this question is both important and intriguing. In the world 
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of the private military/security business many practices have a truly Orwellian touch. The 
lobby organization trying to extend the role of private military companies internationally 
calls itself the “International Peace Operations Association”, calls the military service 
business “the Peace and Stability Industry”, and edits a journal called the Journal of 
International Peace Operations. The question is how that is possible. Why is it that these 
Orwellian practices have become important and widespread? If they appeared totally 
ludicrous (in particular to those the IPOA tries to influence) they would not matter much 
and probably be discontinued. So how has a situation where a substantial part of people 
concerned by security sees these saying and doings as normal come about? To answer 
this question requires a closer at the taken for granted part of practices which was 
introduced in the previous section and repeatedly touched upon when the logic of the 
field and the intersubjectively constituted nature of things (for example capital and 
resources) were touched upon. This section unpacks these references to taken for granted 
and intersubjectively constituted in order to get leverage for answering the question of 
why practices matter. It does so first by recalling the significance of dispositions to think, 
understand and act in given ways for all practices and their acceptance. It then recalls the 
extent to which a broader (discursive) context matters for these dispositions. Finally, the 
section emphasizes that this context is not a structure that hovers over and determines 
practices insisting on the extent to which the context is produced and transformed in 
practices.  
 
a) Acknowledging the habitus  
When introducing the notion of practices above I underlined that when people say that 
they work on practices (rather than actions) they usually want to underline that they 
problematize the rationality of action. That problematization includes recognizing that 
rationality differs by context. Fields (or networks) function differently, different things 
are valued and appreciated and hence what is “rational” also varies by field. It also 
includes acknowledging that a large part of action is unreflected and habitual. It is not 
rational at all in any meaningful way. It rests on unarticulated assumptions about how 
things are and how they word. They are “disposition” to think about, understand and act 
in the social world in specific ways.  
 Working with and explicitly acknowledging this second kind of habitual 
knowledge is one of the hallmarks of practice theory. One way it has been captured and 
integrated into analysis is through the idea of the habitus. Norbert Elias used this notion 
to capture the transformation of the habitual way of behaving which he saw as pivotal to 
the “civilizing process”. In minute detailed he traced the transformation of everyday 
behavior (relating to things like food, speech, and sex) to showing how the self-control 
and discipline which he considered essential for civilization became a habitual part of 
these practices (Elias, 1998/1939). But the notion is perhaps better known through the 
work of Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986, Lahire, 1999, Lawler, 2004, Margolies, 1999, 
McNay, 1999, Taylor, 1999, Vitellone, 2004). Here the notion plays a central role. It is a 
concept linking general discourses and values produced in the field and the habitual 
behavior of individuals. It corresponds to the habits an individual acquires by being in a 
number of different fields in given positions and integrating the rules of the game. Just as 
for Elias, the habitus is also essential to understand the body and its language. The life 
style and habits of people are expressed through bodies (bodily hexis in Bourdieu’s 
 14
terminology). The reason the notion of habitus has attracted so much attention, I think, is 
that it can have a direct bearing on individualist theories of action and is very easily 
linked to discussions about rationality.  
For the discussion here, the habitus is also interesting as away of explaining why 
actors do what they do. But it is also important for a slightly different reason: it is also 
essential to capture why practices are accepted and continued. In particular, if we want to 
explain why practices of domination are accepted, often not resisted and (re)produced 
and continued exactly by those who lose some notion integrating background 
understandings and actions like the habitus is called for. For example, as feminist have 
observed women often engage exactly the practices that reproduce domination to the 
point where they literally kill themselves for example by not requesting healthcare, food 
and by not protecting their daughters (Sen, 1990). Similarly, in the privatizing world of 
the private military industry, the public security establishments are in many rather self-
evident ways losers: statistics and accountancy practices are biased against them, their 
inefficiency and incompetence is relied on to boost the image of the private sector and 
their best competence and staff is drained towards the better paid market (GAO, 2005, 
Leander, 2006a: chap. 7, Markusen, 2003). In spite of this those who might be expected 
to protest and react do not. In part the reason in both these cases is that there are sanctions 
and restrictions that make this kind of behavior necessary. But very often it is a choice 
made because it is considered the right thing to do. Domination more often than not rests 
on the active complicity of the dominated (symbolic violence9).  
In part we can trace this evolving habitus back to the field or bundle of practices 
that is being studied. To understand why the private military business is so readily 
accepted by military establishments for example, it is central look at how the degree to 
which markets have become a central part of military practices. The outsourcing of non-
core activities, the privatized technical support and the fluidity of the boundaries resulting 
from the constant moves between the private and the public has integrated the private 
military/security business into the military. It is increasingly part of the taken for granted 
understandings of what military practices are. Consequently, it is reflected in the evolving 
self-understanding of military professionals who think of themselves as working for 
private contracts and whose “military ethos” of public service is correspondingly 
changing.10 This said, to look at the habitus only from the perspective of the field would 
be too restrictive. It would amount to an implicit claim that the overall acceptance of the 
market was only tied to activities in the field itself. But the habitus of security 
professionals is also shaped by more general developments. It is therefore necessary to 
account also for the broader context in which the practices are embedded.  
 
b) Accounting for contexts / discourses 
To make the point that practices are tied to the broader discursive context is not likely to 
be particularly controversial. Practices and discourses are closely linked. Many authors, 
e.g. Foucault, is routinely classified as both and used as an inspiration for work on both. 
For some authors doing discourse analysis is studying practices (Hansen, 2006). Linking 
                                                 
9 For discussions of symbolic violence see (Bourgeois, 2002, Braud, 2003). 
10 Sapone suggest that this transformation is inherently limited by the illusion of the state monopoly on 
legitimate force which is foundational for our self-understanding (1999) and that the use of force is 
therefore bound to remain a contested or fictitious commodity (Polanyi, 1957, Radin, 1996 respectively). 
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the taken for granted part of activities -- the habitus -- to field is unusual; not pointing out 
that it is linked to a broader context. 
 The broader context is more often than not thought about and studied as a 
“discourse” (Foucault), a “doxa” (Bourdieu) or a “texture” (Derrida). The idea with these 
notions is that social life is imbued with taken for granted, “common sense” 
understandings. They hang together and determine what people do and what they say. A 
“contex is a set of distinct phenomena with power of determination over the entities 
immersed in it” (Schatzki, 2002: 95). Not all contexts are equally deep in their impact 
however. Arguably the most important contexts are those which are not problematized. 
However, many contexts that are not taken for granted, but loudly contested and debated, 
also weigh on behavior. People reflect on their own lives and situations as well as on that 
of others. Therefore, “common sense” is unearthed, articulated, challenged and perhaps 
replaced; the doxa is articulated as orthodoxy and opposed and possibly replaced by a 
heterodoxy which may in term become a new orthodoxy and perhaps even become 
normalized to the point of becoming a doxa. In fact, these explicitly debated and 
contested notions also weigh heavily and we consequently need to be aware of the extent 
to which contexts are “layered” and unequal in their influence. 
The study of these processes and of discursive contexts has often had a heavy text 
bias. The main source for getting at contextual explicit or implicit assumptions has been 
written texts and public statements. The misunderstanding that studying contexts and 
discourses is about reading texts and opposed to doing “empirical work” is therefore 
widespread. This neglects that texts are a form of empirical reality. But more generally is 
misrepresents what studying contexts is about. Context can also be looked at through 
things, such as images, media reporting, blogs, public statements and practices in other 
fields which would (presumably?) pass as “empirical” by most standards (Campbell, 
2007, Fairclough, 2003, Neumann, 2001, , 2007). To highlight this Schatzki suggests 
introducing distinctive terminologies so that “when a context is made out of entities of 
the same sort as those of which it is the context, I call it a texture. When this stuff differs, 
I call it a contexture” (Schatzki, 2002:).  
When thinking about why practices become are accepted and continued, it is useful to 
recall both the multiplicity and the layering of potentially relevant contexts. For instance 
when considering the security practices it is clearly important to take into account the 
texture provided by practices in directly related areas in which these practices are 
involved: the increasing reliance on neo-liberal governance in all areas of political, 
economic and social life for example shapes the way soldiers, administrators in defense 
departments, security firms managers and members of international (non)governmental 
organizations understand security governance (Leander, 2005a, and 2006b).11 Similarly, 
the texture of risk thinking which is increasingly pervasive across all spheres of society 
weighs on directly shapes the taken for granted notion reflected in contemporary security 
practices and in the growing role of the market.12 Neo-liberalism increases the degree to 
which private security market appear normal, desirable and necessary; risk thinking 
                                                 
11 I am clearly referring here to neo-liberal governmentality in a Foucauldian way: that is as governance 
through quasi markets, relying on de-centralization, responsibilization and state withdrawal (e.g. Hindess, 
2004). The pervasiveness of this form of governance is well captured in the literature on the “new public 
management” revolution and its development (e.g. Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 2005, Minow, 2003). 
12 Beck captures this pervasiveness concern which explains the success of his work (1992).  
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makes the private security stand out as filling an exceptionally important and legitimate 
function. It ensures against risk (Leander, 2007b). In addition to these textures, 
contextures created in spheres and practices of a different nature and kind, involving 
different actors, following different logics are also significant for grasping why practices 
are accepted, as already indicated in the discussion about technology. But the point could 
be extended for example to include changes in the way the international financial system 
operates. The activities of many private security firms depend directly on the existence of 
a global financial system through which payments can be funded. They also depend on 
the existence of off-shore financial centres that facilitate obfuscating financial traces and 
the fluidity of headquarters. This contexture, just as technology, encourages, authorizes, 
prohibits certain practices and is part of shaping what international security governance is 
about.  
These (con)textures are not always unarticulated as evidenced by the examples just 
given. There is a lot of public debate about both risk and new public management. There 
is detailed analysis of their workings, critiques of the way they are conceived and 
suggestions for how they might be reformed or done away with. Similarly, at least part of 
the norms and regulations governing international finance and technological systems are 
largely explicit. Laws and regulations are even written down and just as informal norms 
they are interpreted, debated and contested. They are not discourses or doxa; on the 
contrary. However, they are part of the taken for granted background of practices. Their 
disputed and contested nature creates an uncertainty about how exactly this is the case. 
There can be no question of an easy and straightforward “determination” of practices 
through this kind of context, pace Schatzki. This I would like to insist, is in fact generally 
the case. 
 
c) Tracing how practices produce and transform contexts 
Sometimes discourses and doxa are treated as if they were rough equivalents of a 
“structure”. Instead of the classical material or religious or cultural structures we now 
have a form of “discursive” structures that shape actions or practices in a top down 
fashion. This figure of though, misses one of the key advantages about thinking in terms 
of practices. When discourses and doxa are allowed to structure top-down it is rather 
difficult to discern the relevant difference between analysis incorporating these and 
various conventional forms of structuralism. The originality of the “practice-turn” 
evaporates. This is a pity since in fact it does have a distinct, “post-structuralist” relation 
to “structures”. 
This section has so far insisted on the importance of including something like a 
habitus and a context when thinking about practices. It has nowhere suggested that these 
were somehow God given entities floating above the practices and shaping them. Rather, 
they are themselves the outcome of practices, of what actors do and say. This was already 
underlined in the discussion of fields or bundles of practices where the logic of the field 
and the understanding of hierarchies and resources were traced back to the practices in 
the field. An analogous reasoning is at work with regard to habitus and (con)textures. 
These are themselves produced, reproduced and transformed in and through practices.  
Contexts are hence more fluid than structures. They do not have fixed elements or 
aspects whose divergent but recurring expressions we can look for in across contexts as 
did Saussure for language and Levy-Strauss for the organization of family relations. 
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Rather, the elements need to be constantly upheld and produced in practices. 
Correspondingly, what the elements of context are might vary radically. They cannot be 
assumed to be assumed to be fixed neither in time nor in space. As Latour insists “I have 
always found it hard to believe that it was necessary to absorb the exact same types of 
actors, the same entities, the same kinds of beings and the same forms of existence, in the 
same type of collections as those used by Comte, Durkeheim, Weber or Parsons” (Latour, 
2006: 375). It is in this sense that one should read the insistence of post-structuralist 
writers on fluidity, variability and change (Derrida quote??). 
This two-way relationship between contexts and practices makes the way discourses 
and practices are sometimes interchangeably used more comprehensible, if unhelpful 
(practices are a specific bundle of activities the context is what they are embedded in). It 
also has some rather interesting implications for analysis. It implies that not only is there 
no straightforward determination of practices through contexts, but more than this, 
practices are the stuff of contexts. The practices studied can hence be expected to feed 
back into the contexts. How they do that, and how important they are for the reproduction 
of the context, is an empirical question closely tied to how closely the practice and the 
context is related. But it is certainly a question worth considering.  
For example, when we think about global security governance it is of course 
interesting to think about the extent to which practices reflect their context, as for 
example how neo-liberalism reshapes what firms do and say in relation to concrete 
security problems (for example the conflict in Darfur) and how this alters how security 
governance is practiced. However, it is clearly also interesting to keep an eye on how 
these practices reshape, reproduce and reframe neo-liberal security understandings 
(Leander and van Munster, 2007). Similarly, states may be pushing for outsourcing 
strategies in the defense sector. The practices this makes possible in the security sector in 
turn reshuffle power positions inside states as the growing market empowers and 
disempowers people and practices in states unequally (Leander, 2007c). In clear, the 
bottom up move of tracing how practices produce contexts is at least as important as the 
top down tracing of how contexts inform and fashion practices. This many sound rather 
too obvious but it is not: “instead of outlining the visible and modifiable means used to 
produce power, sociology -- and critical sociology in particular -- has all too often 
substituted these by an invisible, immobile, and homogenous world of power in itself” 
(Latour, 2006: 123). 
 When we try to capture why certain practices matter for example in for global 
security governance we are forced to account for context. Thinking about context (as a 
combination of discourses, and other practices) is fundamental because it is the backdrop 
against which we can understand the habitual practices, including what is accepted, 
resisted rejected and what is not. This is an essential part of power. Power is never as 
strong as strong as when it rests on consent and collaboration and does not have to be 
forcefully imposed. For thinking about governance this classical insight is of essence. 
Part of our understanding of this kind of habitual behavior can be derived from the field 
itself. But if we want to get a better grasp of how systemic bias is mobilized in the 
specific bundle of practices / the field, we need to look also beyond the field. Looking 
beyond the field is even more important if we are interested not mainly in explaining 
action and strategies, but in looking at issues of governance. As suggested in the last 
section, practices produce and reshape contexts. This is essential for governance. To 
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return to the Orwellian world of private security governance, if we restrict ourselves to 
looking at context to explain why the IPOA can and does behave as it does we have 
moved some way towards understanding why real world security governance looks the 
way it does. But if we do not move back upwards, and re-assemble the effects of these 
practices on the broader context, we are bound miss what these practices do to security 
governance elsewhere. We effectively deprive ourselves of the luxury of thinking about 
how governance is changing and how that change might be shaped. 
 
 
4) Thinking of Practices as Governance: Ordering, Resistance and Reflexivity 
 
This paper has so far given an account of what it means to think in terms of practices. It 
has emphasized that doing so leads us to map what practices matter and to place these in 
context that will help deepen and clarify the understanding of how they matter. Through 
the account, remarks about the analysis of business (and particularly of the private 
military/security business) and global governance have figured centrally. It is time to pull 
these remarks together and develop them so that they can be used to clarify how exactly 
analyzing practices may be useful for the analysis of global governance. This section 
does this. It starts by clarifying that the notion of “global governance” inherent in the 
analysis of practices is one of ordering. It proceeds to argue that this understanding of 
global governance is inherently useful for understanding change as pays explicit attention 
to the strategies of and the scope for resistance to governance. Finally, the section 
concludes with a note on the centrality of reflexivity in practice based accounts of global 
governance. 
 
a) Practices Producing Ordering 
The analysis of practices provides us with an understanding of how of activity is 
organized in a given field and why this is so. It provides us with an understanding of what 
activities, of what kind of actors matter in that field and why. It in other words provides 
us with an understanding of “order” in that field where order is understood “as 
arrangement, that is the hanging together of things […in which..] entities relate, enjoy 
meaning (and identity), and are positioned with respect to one another.” (Schatzki, 2002: 
18 and 38). We find ourselves in the neighborhood of global governance. 
 One of the most common ways of thinking about “global governance” is as a form 
of order. Questions about global governance are often asked as questions about “world 
order”. This is perhaps not so surprising in view of the lasting imprint of Hobbes on 
political thinking (or the simplistic rendering thereof) generally and on thinking in IR/IPE 
in particular. What this thinking has done is to constitute two opposing realms of order 
(inside) and anarchy (outside). Thinking about “global governance” in this context has 
come to connote thinking about how the international anarchical realm might after all be 
subjected to a modicum of order. In the wake of the “globalization” debates a normative 
touch has been added to this discussion as global governance is seen as the hope for 
taming globalization, or limiting the extent to which the (outside) “anarchy” abroad 
comes to define also (inside) order (e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002). As eloquently argued 
by Ashley twenty years ago, this enterprise is bound to fail as long as it is based on the 
practices of a diplomatic community assuming that there can be no community and no 
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international authority (Ashley, 1989). As repeatedly underlined above, the analysis of 
practices moves away from this state centric understanding of order. It is an analysis of 
order that is open to the possibility that the relevant actors might not be states and even 
that states may be altogether marginal. 
 The orders of global governance rendered visible through practices are orders 
where authority may be located with any actor.13 In that sense studying global 
governance in this sense has much in common with the research on “private authority” in 
IPE (Cutler et al., 1999, Hall and Bierstecker, 2002). For example, to understand the 
global security governance the emergence of a new cast of private security experts 
advising armed forces, governments, international organizations, firms and individuals 
and in the process reshaping the understanding of security problems, adequate responses 
and appropriate governance forms is of vital important. This creation of private actors 
who authorities in security is bound to be missed in analysis directed only at those 
formally in authority through their links with states. Practice analysis is really good at 
capturing substantive changes in authority and particular changes in who is an authority. 
It will tell us quite a lot about the evolving reasons why authority fluctuates and changes. 
It will give us good clues about why people “surrender judgment” and accept that 
practices are organized as they are. It may be less useful when to account for the formal 
procedural developments of authority, that is the changes in the formal arrangements of 
institutionalized authority relations. For many political theorists and lawyers who find the 
formal and procedural more important this may be disappointing. The reason this concern 
is central to them is that they are more interested in the normative question of how 
legitimate authority can be created, exercised and controlled than in it’s the empirical 
question of its actual exercise (Flathman, 1980). As I see it, from a sociological or an IPE 
perspective these priorities are often inversed. Understanding the empirical and 
substantial authority is often the aim. Moreover, I would contend that thinking about the 
formal and procedural should more often be built on such empirical and substantive 
understandings. This is the only plausible guard against discussions of authority turning 
into abstract reasoning for reasoning’s sake.  
 The orders of global governance produced by practices merit one more comment: 
they are less static than the orders people usually have in mind when they talk about 
global governance. In the above discussion fluidity and change have been permanently 
present. It has been emphasized that who is part of a practice changes; that what counts as 
resource changes; that dominant practices evolve etc. But perhaps most importantly it has 
been emphasized that order and authority has to be continuously produced. That it exists 
through these ever changing practices. This emphasis on non-fixity contradicts the static 
connotation of order. “Ordering” may therefore be a better expression for the kind of 
global governance an analysis of practices can help us capture.14 Talking about ordering 
rather than order has the further advantage that it more adequately captures the degree to 
which analyzing global governance through practices helps highlight change. 
                                                 
13 In calling this form of order global governance I am making a choice different from that made by others 
in the discipline. Susan Strange for example reserved governance to talk about rule through state authority 
and hence talked about “ungovernance” to capture the developments increasing the role of private actors as 
authorities (discussed by Cohen, 1998: chap?, Strange, 1996). To me this distinction makes to much out of 
the private public distinction and is unhelpful in a context where privatization has become a form of 
government rule that often helps and stabilizes states (including in the sphere of security) Leander??.  
14 This point is emphasized in general terms by (Law, 1992) and  (Dreyfus, 1992).  
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b) Ordering and the Scope for Resistance 
Looking at global governance as a set of ordering practices explicitly directs attention to 
the constant need to (re)produce order. By the same token, zooms in on the potential for 
change and for what would often be termed “resistance”. If orders are not permanent 
creations hovering outside and above actors but constantly created in practices, through 
interactions, it is not only possible but likely and logical that those involved should 
pressure for change and resist domination. This is the perspective from which one can 
understand Bourdieu’s instance that fields are both fields of positions and of struggle. It 
is also the perspective from which Foucault insistence on the omni-presence of resistance 
makes sense.  
 For thinking about the global governance and the role of business this permanent 
and integral focus on change and on “resistance” is extremely useful. It makes it not only 
possible but logical and necessary to include an account of the “strategies” of business 
(and other actors) use when they struggle to reshape ordering practices. For example, 
there can be no doubt that the military/security business has been strategically, 
instrumentally and rather effectively engaged in shifting the boundaries of the security 
field outwards so that more and more activities fall within the realm of their expertise. 
That is to enlarge the bundle of practices falling within the “security” realm. Post-conflict 
reconstruction, Security Sector Reform, Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation 
programs but also border control, immigration, straight forward development aid and 
diplomacy are part of private security firms have managed to place within the field of 
security practices and to make fall inside the scope of their own activities (Leander, 
2007a). In the process of thus enlarging the field, security sector ordering (governance) is 
altered. Who has authority to do what, how and to whom have been transformed. As the 
understanding of security governance has changed so has the regulatory clout of existing 
institutions. In the present legal discussion about how to increase accountability of 
private security contractors it is telling that the UN and AU conventions against 
mercenarism have all but disappeared from view. Instead self-regulation, institutionalized 
industry standards and the laws of the armed forces occupy a central space. The 
traditional founding blocs of the formal procedural regulating private uses of force 
internationally normative framework are effectively sidelined -- but not eliminated -- by 
practice. Accounting for the business advertising, lobbying, and representational 
strategies though which these changes occur is what analyzing practices does. 
 The way practice analysis focuses on strategies of change and “resistance” 
highlights the permanent presence of change, but also its limits. This understanding 
contrast with much work on global governance (and other forms of order) where order is 
assumed to be the norm and change the exception. Indeed change is often thought of as 
either a potential to be deduced from the normal order or as something occurring 
primarily during crisis. The first case leads to a searching for the scope conditions that 
might trigger change and/or make resistance possible. The second looks at “critical 
junctures” or crisis  during which things are unstable and open to change. Thinking in 
terms of practices breaks down the dichotomous distinction and creates place for change 
also in seemingly normal times. It highlights that change is always present in that 
practices that produce order but also limited by the logic of the field and the context. 
Indeed, both Bourdieu and Foucault decidedly down-play the role of exceptional 
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circumstances in bringing about change. Foucault’s large macro changes (from 
punishment to discipline e.g.) take place for reasons that are not clearly tied to any crisis 
or any exceptional circumstance. Even more provocatively Bourdieu explicitly highlights 
the limited impact of major crisis. The state nobility has successfully reproduced itself 
French revolution (Bourdieu, 1998). Moreover both authors emphasize continuity.15 
There is no reason to deny that change time might happen more rapidly in certain 
situations than in others. The point here is that the dichotomies order/change, order/crisis 
may not be very helpful in accounting for when. 
Finally, it bears underlining that resistance and change as thought of in practices 
does come with a baggage of predetermined normative connotations. Whether one thinks 
resistance and change are positive or negative depends on what view one has on how 
ordering arrangements should look. This is not something that practice analysis is 
particularly useful for formulating. Rather ideas of how orderings should look are better 
sought in political imagination. i.e. in political theory or philosophy. The analysis of 
practices is useful for understanding of why resistance and change takes the form it does 
and how they shift ordering. That however, is a rather essential question for many people, 
including those working on business and global governance.  
 
c) Resistance and Reflexivity 
Before wrapping up this discussion about what it means to analyze global governance 
through practices a (very short) note on the particular role of “reflexivity”16 is warranted. 
Reflexivity indeed has a far more central place in the work of most scholars working on 
practices than it does elsewhere, at least in IR/IPE. The two versions we have of 
reflexivity in our part of the disciplines is (1) Cox’s cautioning that since “science is 
always for someone” it is important to be aware of whom one is working for and (2) a 
post-structuralist concern with making the author visible resulting in Derderian letting us 
know the colour of the book he reads in Sarajevo (2001). In work on practices, reflexivity 
has a far more central place. This is no doubt because of the centrality of meaning and 
hence an awareness of the role of interpretation and of the interpreter, but also because of 
the close links to anthropology, ethnography and ethnomethodology. 
 Reflexivity is a central part of the research strategies in work on practices. It plays 
a central role in the choice of research topics. Sometimes and particularly for those 
considering themselves as working in a “critical” traditions for reasons echoing those of 
Cox namely a wish to emancipate an assumed oppressed group. However, more often the 
concern is a more generic wish to unveil domination and especially that domination 
which is usually overlooked in standard framing of topics. It also plays a role in 
methodology. Reflexivity is the only (and admittedly imperfect) way of limiting the 
inevitable distortion of an observer of the observed. Observers cannot view the world 
from nowhere any more than can their objects study. Nor can they control the impact of 
their presence on the observed. When I talk to security professionals in different contexts 
                                                 
15 Regarding the evolution of government forms e.g. Foucault explains that: “Il n'y a pas remplacement des 
formes historiques mais...On a en fait un triangle: souveraineté, discipline et gestion gouvernementale, une 
gestion gouvernementale dont la cible principale est la population et dont les mécanismes essentiels sont les 
dispositifs de sécurité” (2004 : 111). 
16 The dictionary definition of reflexivity is bending back and self-reflecting. For a more detailed 
definitional discussion see (Leander, 2005b). 
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I cannot but remain the Swedish/French, woman academic I am with all the implications 
that has for what I will be (or not) told and how. Nor can I of course write about it in 
another language than my own.17 Thirdly, reflexivity in the analysis of practices is 
understood as essential because if problematizes the relation between the own research 
and the researched object. The observer is not assumed to be an outsider looking down at 
practices and observing their meaning. Somewhat more realistically, observers are 
acknowledged to have (at least potentially) a part in the meaning production in that 
world. They may be interacting directly with the world they are depicting as “experts” 
and certainly they interact with it indirectly through their writings and teaching. Their 
account of and representations of the world they observe feeds back into that world.18 
Indeed, in highly literate and mediatized societies where experts are constantly debating 
and expressing their views it would be surprising if there was not a feedback loop.19 For 
that reason observers have the responsibility not to naturalize domination and obscure 
power; that is to be reflexive about their work. I suspect that most people working on 
practices would agree with Strange that the privileges of academia come with the 
obligation to work critically and interpret it in this sense. 
 Reflexivity in the analysis of practices is important also in a second way: it is seen 
as central for the observed. In that sense most scholars working on practices would no 
doubt side with Strange in another of her recurring lamentations: that regarding academic 
hubris. For rather unclear reasons observers often seems to assume that knowledge and 
even more reflexivity is the preserve of their own breed. Of course, this is not the case. 
People who engage in a practice almost by definition know more about it than outsiders. 
They also reflect more about it. People who work with practices usually see their 
acknowledgement and use of this as something that decidedly distinguishes them from 
other researchers. They actually do not look down on their researched object. They do not 
assume that they know about its positions, motivations, roles, values and strategies before 
they start. Analyzing practices is about uncovering these things. On Latour’s account for 
example the point of departure of ANT was the crisis of the “sociology of science”, 
looking down on scientists and deciding beforehand what was of relevance. This crisis 
could only be triggered, so Latour, because when looking at science, sociologists were by 
definition looking upwards.20 The knowledge and reflexivity of those engaged in a 
practice will obviously NOT provide the answer to ones research questions. There is an 
obvious difference between the observers wish to analyze, understand and explain and 
the self-descriptive, reflective accounts of those engaged in a practice. But listing 
carefully to those accounts is of essence. 
                                                 
17 For an IPE related discussion see (Leander, 2002). For a detailed, empirically relevant discussion of this 
problem see (Bourdieu, 1993: ??). 
18 For a general discussion of looping effects see (Sparti, 2001).. 
19 Indeed it is to reflect this trend that the current era is sometimes qualified as “reflexive” (e.g. Beck et al., 
1994) 
20 “there is in fact, an excellent reason why the case of science was bound to make social theory fail so 
completely: it was the first time sociologists were really studying upwards… until then the sociologists had 
always looked down since the power of science remained at their side and was not itself subject to 
examination... The cogwheels of the explanans had always been forged in harder steel than those of the 
explanandum; no surprise that they so readily shaped proofs and so effortlessly provided data...” (Latour, 
2006: 139-140, my translations emphasis in the original text). 
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 To sum up then: analyzing global governance (of security e.g.) through practices 
means thinking about global governance as a form of order which may involve any 
number and kind of actors. Practices are used to get a grasp of how substantial authority 
works. This of course has implications also for formal and procedural authority, but the 
focus of an analysis of practices is on global governance as the production of sociological 
and empirical orders. Second, as the emphasis on the production of order suggests 
analyzing global governance through practices also means that change and resistance 
become a central and integral part of the account. The struggles and strategies are 
constitutive of the practices producing order. It was therefore suggested that ordering 
might actually be a better term for the kind of global governance uncovered by studies of 
practice. Finally, the has been emphasized that the kind of global governance uncovered 
by work on practices is highly shaped by reflexivity. This is true in double the sense that 
reflexivity figures prominently in the research strategy and in the sense that the reflexive 
competence of those engaged in the practices studied is respected and plays a central role 
in the analysis.  
 
Conclusion:  
In this paper I have tried to explain why have ended up working with practice theory to 
think about something global governance of security. I began by pointing to two 
recurring frustrations I had when communicating about the private military/security 
business. One was that of trying to talk about something that was excluded from the 
discussion by an excessively formalistic take on what governance meant. The second was 
the frustration of trying to communicate about changes in the assumptions about what 
security and security governance was all about in the face of a discussion that was firmly 
stuck with issues of how to deal with the governance of individual cases. I suggested that 
looking at practices for me was a way of getting a theoretical leverage to move away 
from these discussions and raise the issues that seemed important to me. I then proceeded 
to clarify why I say this. I first pointed to the utility of practice theory being open about 
what and whose activities, sayings and doings, are part of a specific practice (for example 
security governance) and on its utility for “mapping” the hierarchy of the relevance of 
these activities (helping me out of my first frustration). I then suggested that practice 
theory also usually directs attention to context (as (con)texturte). Indeed, to address the 
question of why activities matter as they do in a practice but also to understand how the 
practice relates to other practices, it has to take the context into account (addressing my 
second frustration). In the last section, I pulled this together clarifying what I think 
analyzing practices means in terms of thinking about global governance, underlining that 
it meaning thinking about governance as ordering and emphasizing reflexivity.  
 
 
 This argument has already answered the questions posed by the editors of this 
volume. But to make sure they are clear beyond doubt I want to address them explicitly: 
 
- The research questions that can usefully be addressed by this form of theorizing 
are those concerning the evolving substantive nature of order and authority and its 
implications. 
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- Hence, the approach problematizes the business-governance nexus as such by 
placing the mapping of whose activities matter and why for a specific order 
(governance) at the centre. 
 
- I would place this squarely in the “understanding” tradition as it emphasizes the 
significance of socially constituted meaning. However, scholars in the field and 
elsewhere have tried to suggest that it overcomes the traditional dichotomy 
between explaining and understanding approaches (e.g. Brubaker, 2004, Pouliot, 
2007). The “interpretative principle” it is based on is that the social world is 
that contextuality is of fundamental importance. This makes it impossible to make 
a priori assumptions about how practices work and what kinds of order they 
constitute. Rather, a central aim of the interpretation is to reconstitute this. 
Theoretical contributions take the form of arguments that make the analysis of 
practices easier, either because they are conceptual innovations that improve the 
understanding of underlying concepts (viz example discussions around field, 
habitus, object actors, dispositifs, assemblages etc. etc) or because they highlight 
recurring processes/mechanisms that by analogous reasoning can be found across 
a range of practices.  
 
- The “key concepts” vary slightly depending on what practice approach one 
works with but also depending on how one interprets that approach. I have 
elsewhere suggested that Bourdieu’s approach can usefully be thought as resting 
on the triology field, habitus, practice (Leander, 2007d). Latour suggests that his 
approach rests centrally rests on the combination actors/objects, networks, and 
assemblages (Latour, 2005). Schatzki sees his approach as resting on the 
combination order, practices, assemblages (Schatzki, 2002). And the list could be 
prolonged. As just suggested conceptual innovation and transformation is central 
to work in practice theory and to disagreements within it.  
 
- The theoretical implication of the growing attention to Business and Global 
governance is that research based on the analysis of practices becomes 
increasingly useful and perhaps therefore also more widespread as it actually 
makes it possible to talk about that question ☺. 
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